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On 31 March 2019, Turkey’s municipal elections resulted in a shock defeat for the
ruling AK Party of president Erdo#an in the overwhelming majority of metropolitan
cities. The Supreme Electoral Board canceled the Istanbul election soon after by
announcing its reasoning on 22 May. The entire process illustrates how the AK
Party has been adjusting the electoral law in a way that has now resulted in the
cancellation and re-run of Istanbul’s mayoral election.
The AK Party has lost the mayoral race after 25 years in Istanbul, Turkey’s economic
hub and watershed city for socio-political change. Popular support for the AK Party
has declined nation-wide by 1,5 % compared to the parliamentary elections in 2018,
but it maintained its votes mostly in the central, eastern, south-eastern and north-
eastern provinces.
Upon objections of the AK Party, either all votes or the invalid votes were recounted
in 18 districts of Istanbul (approximately 850,000 votes). The recounting took
several days, but under effective civic monitoring including the representatives of the
opposition and citizen initiatives with a strong commitment to electoral integrity. The
Bureau of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe
(CoE) decided to maintain its oversight of the Turkish municipal elections during
recounting.
According to the recounting, the candidate of the main opposition party CHP, Ekrem
Imamo#lu, won the mayoral election in Istanbul with a margin of 13,729 votes
against Binali Y#ld#r#m of AK Party, the last prime minister. The prosecutors have
launched investigations upon the AK Party’s allegation of “organized fraud”. After
an appeal of the AK Party, the Supreme Electoral Board canceled the metropolitan
mayoral election. In its decision, the Board focuses on the claims of irregularities
particularly regarding the voting tally sheets and the determination of Ballot Box
Chairs in 754 boxes out of 31,186. The decision has also indirect, but controversial
implications. First, the cancellation grounds will not be applied to the election of
district mayors and municipal councils despite the fact that they are elected by the
same ballot envelope of metropolitan mayoral election under the oversight of the
same Ballot Box Committees. Second, the cancellation ground regarding the Ballot
Box Chairs could also be valid for the recent parliamentary and presidential elections
in 2018, but this was not previously checked. Hence, this will have no legal impact
on them.
The mayoral election will be re-run on 23 June. A do-over for Istanbul opens a new
chapter in Turkey’s autocratic populism that has purported the electoral victory at the
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ballot box as the strong legitimization for a long time. In the current course of events,
it does not capture the elections in a conventional manner, but challenges the results
through a re-run of the elections. This is a risky strategy as it aims to resurrect power
at the ballot box by an electoral victory. The legal and political context of this political
gambling supported by the Supreme Electoral Board requires a closer examination
since it also has the potential of becoming a common strategy for other populist
governments of comparative jurisdictions tending to pseudo-democratic methods.
Besides, Istanbul’s case urges to rethink the thin veneers of electoral law and
gripping practices via electoral monitoring bodies in constitutional democracies (see,
e.g., Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas, How to Rig an Election; Samuel Issacharoff
et. al, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process; Judith G.
Kelley, Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and
Why It Often Fails).
Legal framework for electoral stability
Turkey has adopted a system of electoral monitoring since 1950. Currently, the
electoral process and standards are pre-defined in detail and in clear terms in the
Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers (“Law on Elections”)
which also apply to municipal elections. The entire process, including the verification
and registration of eligible voters, the composition of Ballot Box Committees and
the determination of their chairs, is regulated under the oversight of the Supreme
Electoral Board and Municipal Electoral Boards (provincial boards and district
boards). The jurisdictional issues as well as the counting, confirmation, finalization,
appeal and objection procedures are prescribed comprehensively. The case law,
decisions and circulars of the Supreme Electoral Board that have put the electoral
law in concrete terms in the last 69 years provide guidance for conducting the
elections in a predictable manner.
The electoral administration and monitoring system of Turkey has been developed
progressively in consonance with the principles of fair elections and public scrutiny
as prescribed in the Constitution and electoral legislation. The principle of stability
in electoral legislation is also enshrined in the Constitution and is in line with
international good practices, and particularly the Venice Commission’s Code of Good
Practice in Electoral Matters (Article 67, paragraph 6): “Amendments to the electoral
laws shall not apply to the elections to be held within one year from the entry into
force date of the amendments.”
This legal framework has secured electoral legitimacy and confidence in the ballot
box to a larger extent until recent times, despite allegations of frauds and rigging
disputes. Compared to the harsh criticism against the Constitutional Court and
theCouncil of State, the Supreme Electoral Board has never been seriously attacked
in public discussions even though it has atypical and extensive powers. These
powers comprise both the administration, monitoring and review duties pertaining
to the elections to be conducted in a fair and transparent manner. The issues of
accessibility and quality of the Board’s decisions have been a matter of concern
solely in scholarly circles (see particularly, Levent Gönenç, Türkiye’de Seçim
Uyu#mazl#klar# ve Çözüm Yollar#).
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The Supreme Electoral Board, established in 1950, is a constitutional institution that
is tasked with securing electoral integrity country-wide. Its decisions are binding and
final without being subject to any judicial review. It has 7 members and 4 alternate
members, all of them judges who serve six-year terms. The political parties have
also representatives in the Board, but without any voting rights. 6 judges are elected
by the Court of Cassation and 5 judges are elected by the Council of State, two
apex courts of supreme judiciary. Provincial Electoral Boards, too, are also entirely
composed of judges, three judges serving two-year terms (Article 15 of the Law on
Elections). The representatives of the political parties have again no voting rights.
District Electoral Boards are the most inclusive electoral body. They are presided
by a judge but include representatives from the political parties and civil servants
as full members with voting rights (Articles 18 and 19 of the Law on Elections). The
fact that judges play a significant role in all electoral boards makes the institutional
and decisional quality of them contingent on the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. However, the inclusiveness factor in the District Electoral Boards serves as
a safeguard in line with the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral
Matters.
Changing the electoral law
The relevance of electoral law has first become evident during Turkey’s presidential
shift in 2017. The Supreme Electoral Board’s reliability has been extensively
questioned by the public, primarily in the constitutional referendum in April 2017.
The referendum has resulted in Turkey’s departure from the long experienced
parliamentary system by adopting a sort of presidentialism that augments the
executive power of president Erdo#an and completely changes the institutional
balance against the parliament. Yet, the amendment was approved by a very narrow
margin amid a controversial decision of the Supreme Electoral Board on the day of
the referendum and during the voting process, according to which the ballots that
have not been verified by the Ballot Box Committees by stamping are considered
valid. This decision did not comply with the explicit wording of the Law on Elections
and electoral practices that required stamping. However, the Board stated that
priority shall be given to the will of the voters against the omissions of Ballot Box
Committees as regards stamping. It emphasized the essence of the right to vote
by referring to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention of Human
Rights, but by turning a blind eye to the irregularity according to the wording of
the legislation. The Board’s decision was criticized in the public discussions as an
unjustified intervention into the voting process that allows electoral frauds. Yet, it has
been integrated into the new legislation on elections adopted by the parliamentary
majority of the ruling AK Party and its ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) right
before the snap elections in June 2018 (Article 98, paragraph 4 of the Law on
Elections).
There was no public debate or any attempt of inclusiveness – through public or
scholarly consultation – during the preparation of this new legislation. Still, it has
provided major changes. They include the allowing of electoral alliances between
political parties and other disputable novelties such as the moving or merging of
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polling stations based on security considerations and the possibility for voters living
in the same building address to be assigned to different polling stations.
All these changes, that were introduced shortly before presidential and parliamentary
elections, bring into question, of course, the full respect for the constitutional
principle of stability. They were adopted on the ground of an exceptional clause in
the constitutional amendment on presidentialism in 2017. The clause has suspended
the constitutional principle of stability in order to harmonize the laws of electoral
legislation to implement the new presidential system (provisional Article 21 H of the
Constitution). However, the new legislation has not only introduced harmonizing
provisions, but has brought about fundamental changes that have an impact
on the electoral management. Additionally, the government has extended the
tenure of Supreme Electoral Board members to one year (till 2020 and 2023
respectively) before the municipal elections. This reinforces the perceptions of a
political bias in the Board. Ignoring the principle of stability, the Constitutional Court
has declared this strategic and hasty intervention into the institutional design of
electoral monitoring as constitutional since the terms of members are not defined in
the Constitution (E. 2019/14, K. 2019/16, 14 March 2019).
Civil servants as key actors of the new legislation
The leading objection of the ruling AK Party in the Istanbul election relates to a
provision that has been introduced by the new legislation. The new legislation
stipulates that “civil servants” shall also serve as members of the Ballot Box
Committees. The previous legislation prescribed that Ballot Box Committees shall
draw their presidents by lot among candidates proposed by the political parties.
Under the new legislation, the chair of the Ballot Box Committee shall be a civil
servant of the district. He or she is chosen by the president of the relevant District
Electoral Board, the senior judge, from a list prepared by provincial governors, but
shortened by a lot subject to public scrutiny (Article 22 of the Law on Elections).
Since the provincial governors send the list of civil servants to the District Electoral
Board, the Ministry of Interior Affairs can in fact oversee the process. The new
legislation also explicitly provides that ordinary citizens in the electoral district can
serve in the Ballot Box Committees as members if there is a need and no obstacle
for their appointments (Article 23 final paragraph).
These changes have been criticized by the opposition parties and the Venice
Commission. They are concerned about the impartiality since the executive
branch has control over the civil servants and there is a risk of arbitrariness to
appoint ordinary persons vulnerable to governmental pressure. Nonetheless,
these legislative changes are upheld by the Constitutional Court because of civil
servants’ duty of impartiality and because the electoral oversight of political parties’
representatives has not been limited (E. 2018/69, K. 2018/47, 31 May 2018, paras.
45-59). In the Istanbul election, 754 Ballot Box Chairs were not civil servants but
other professionals, seemingly in line with previous electoral practices. The AK Party
has challenged these Ballot Box Chairs as an irregularity. It has also referred to
irregularities regarding voting tally sheets and ineligible voters.
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The Supreme Electoral Board’s decision: ill-
grounded justifications
The Supreme Electoral Board canceled the Istanbul election in a majority ruling of 7
judges out of 11. The Board’s decision was announced on 6 May, but the 250-page
long reasoning was released on 22 May. The ruling also includes dissenting opinions
of 4 judges. Despite the length of the ruling which refers to numerous data (places,
names etc.) regarding the irregularity claims, the Board could not demonstrate the
reliable argumentation based on concrete evidence that the alleged irregularities
were consequential enough to have a decisive impact on the final results of the
election. As a reflection of the principle of stability, the Law on Elections requires the
fulfillment of the principle of causality in extraordinary appeals as in this case (Article
130). Accordingly, the irregularity should bear a decisive impact on the electoral
outcome. A distinction between significant and insignificant electoral violations are
to be made where de minimis irregularities do not result in the cancellation of an
election – an impactful decision with serious political implications. There are previous
decisions of the Board that strictly apply the principle of causality in similar appeals
even for small electoral districts where the political impact of a re-run would be
less problematic than in Istanbul (see particularly the dissenting opinions of Cengiz
Topakta# and Yunus Ayk#n). Indeed, the Law on Elections expects that political
party representatives scrutinize the determination of chairs and raise objections in
due time defined in the legislation before the elections. Otherwise, an evidential link
is required.
Importantly, the Board does not refer to an evidential link between the irregularities
identified and the real distribution of votes in the relevant boxes. First, the Board –
strikingly and clearly – admits that the irregularities (lack of signatures, lack of sheets
etc.) found in the voting tally sheets of 108 ballot boxes do not have any decisive
impact on the electoral outcome by themselves. Second, and incomprehensibly, it
concludes that the irregularities in the sheets impair the electoral safety combined
with the fact that 754 ballot box chairs are not determined among civil servants.
Moreover, the Board focuses, unconvincingly, on the total amount of votes in the
relevant boxes, but not the real distribution of the votes at them. In fact, the data
on real distribution of the votes between political parties is absolutely necessary
as a genuine evidence to make a rightful analysis for a consequential electoral
irregularity.
Besides, there is no correlation between the irregularities in the sheets and the ballot
boxes where the chairs are not civil servants. As clearly highlighted in Judge Yunus
Ayk#n’s dissenting opinion, in only 2 out of the disputed 754 ballot boxes there was
an irregularity in the sheets (lack of signatures). The number of ineligible voters
in the elections was also rather insignificant (706 citizens) with no impact on the
results. Finally, the Board ignored the effectiveness of public scrutiny provided by
the representatives of political parties in the relevant boxes. There are 5 political
representatives in the Ballot Box Committees who can monitor the process and
object to the decisions of a chair (Article 84 paragraph 4 of the Law on Elections).
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The number of AK Party representatives (1,104) in the disputed 754 ballot boxes
was higher than that of CHP representatives (979).
To sum up, the weaknesses of the ruling result in a highly politicized decision, a pro-
government petitio principii.
Democratic resilience between mobilization and
victimization
The re-run of Istanbul’s mayoral election will be a test of democratic resilience for
Turkish electoral politics. The mobilization of frustrated voters who did not go to the
polls (1,705,677 voters) and the careless or less educated voters as the owners
of invalid votes (314,243 votes) in the canceled election may play the key role.
Kurdish votes that supported the opposition candidate Imamo#lu are still significant
for the end results. The recent elections and referendums have witnessed an active
civic engagement for electoral integrity conducted by non-partisan groups, such as
Vote and Beyond with its network of observers. Their mobilization may provide an
effective monitoring against new fraud strategies since they are well-equipped in
Istanbul in terms of human capacity and knowledge. The fact that the opposition
parties and their observers have performed well in the recent recounting period
is a political advantage for them. The government, however, seems to invest in
mobilization campaigns by intensive presidential meetings and demonstrations.
Its tight control over the previous, but currently frustrated supporters of the AK
Party, other voters and the polls may secure them an ultimate victory. The AK
Party’s electoral representative network has been wider, pro-active and remarkably
dominant at the polls for years.
The government’s challenge against the results is primarily based on the argument
that the AK Party has won the majority in the district mayoral elections and municipal
council elections in Istanbul, but lost the metropolitan mayoral election. The
recounting has revealed that there is a positive correlation between the percentage
of votes classified as invalid in the first counting and the votes for the AK Party. The
former are classified in favor of the AK Party in the recounting. The difference of
votes between two candidates has decreased, therefore, to 13,729 from 29,408.
Consequently, the Board’s decision and the narrow margin provide political support
for the AK Party to repeat its victimization rhetoric for their alleged “stolen votes” and
“organized fraud” to secure another win at the ballot box. Victimization has been the
most powerful argument of the AK Party’s populism that mobilized and galvanized
its grassroots for years. It remains to be seen whether it will work again against the
popularity of another victim, the opposition candidate Imamo#lu.
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